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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Bar asserts in its brief that Calder is somehow 
improperly asking the Court " . . . to focus on the trees in the 
hope it will not see the forest." (Brief at 75), This is only 
partly true: the central thrust of Calderfs appeal is indeed to 
have the Court review the individual factual components of this 
case and conclude that they do not support the Bar's recommenda-
tion of disbarment; to say, however, this process is calculated 
to obscure the big picture is without merit. It is precisely 
because the forest can never be greater than the sum total of its 
trees that the Bar becomes defensive about the nature and extent 
of Calder1s focus — a focus designed to expose a number of 
structural flaws in the Bar's Findings themselves and in the pro-
cess by which a number of seemingly innocuous and unrelated facts 
are cleverly crafted into superficially plausible, but decidedly 
misleading Findings, 
These flaws, the most salient of which are addressed in 
this reply, require the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations 
to be vacated. If they are not, the Bar will have successfully 
removed one of its members for conduct that it never adequately 
identified, on evidence with which no reasonable, fair-minded 
person could be satisfied. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE PANEL IMPROPERLY RELIED UPON EVIDENCE OF 
CALDER'S POST-1986 CONDUCT IN ISSUING ITS 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, 
Recognizing that the Complaints are devoid of any alle-
gations regarding Calder's post-1986 conduct, the Bar seeks to 
justify its Panel's reliance on such conduct by arguing that the 
Complaints' mention of pre-1986 conduct placed Calder on suffi-
cient notice of its intent to disbar him for conduct nowhere 
alleged in the Complaints; that the failure of Calder's former 
counsel to object to the introduction of some of the conduct per-
mits the Complaints to be amended to conform to the evidence; 
and, that even though the Panel admitted such evidence because it 
went to Calder's "state of mind/1 it can now also be relied upon 
on issues such as Calder's credibility, Calder's competence and 
the "issue of sanctions." (Brief at 16, 17). These arguments, 
however, miss the mark. 
First, the gravamen of both Complaints is that Calder 
failed to adequately protect his clients' interests and engaged 
in conduct until 1986 that further eroded those interests. What-
ever else can be said about the Panel's unarticulated intent to 
explore Calder's post-1986 conduct in connection with his own 
bankruptcies, it undeniably prejudiced Calder by giving him no 
advance indication that the Panel's only conclusions of dishon-
esty and fraud would be those based upon his 1988 conduct. If, 
as the Bar asserts, "Calder's conduct in his personal bankrupt-
cies was inextricably connected with the factual allegations and 
disciplinary rule violations set forth in the [Complaints]," 
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Brief at 24, why did the Bar studiously refrain from alleging in 
the Complaints, even in conclusory fashion, the existence of this 
11
 inextricable connection?11 By so refraining, the Bar effectively 
manufactured and dispensed the gravest possible prejudice to 
Calder: springing on him without warning an excursion into con-
duct nowhere expressed in the Complaints. The presence of such 
unfair prejudice precludes any finding that Calder impliedly con-
sented to the trying of such issues. The plain fact remains: 
had the Bar wanted to impose sanctions on the basis of post-1986 
conduct, it could easily have expressed its intent to do so. No 
matter how vigorously the Bar now seeks to recharacterize its 
Complaints, the Complaints are devoid of any intention to chal-
lenge the sufficiency of Calder's disclosures to the bankruptcy 
court in connection with his own personal bankruptcy filings. 
Next, Calderfs former counsel expressly objected to the 
Panel's consideration of the bankruptcy court's memorandum deci-
sion and order dated December 27, 1988. (Tr. 179-83). In urging 
the Panel to overrule the objection, the Bar's prosecutor (after 
initially arguing that the evidence bore on both Calder's compe-
tence and mental state, see Tr. 180), narrowed the rationale for 
his attempted introduction of the Order to the assertion that it 
went to Calder's "state of mind." (Tr. 182). It was on this nar-
row basis that the Panel decided to admit the Order. (Tr. 183). 
1
 It should be noted here that the alleged failure of Calderfs 
former counsel to conduct formal discovery is irrelevant to the 
disposition of this issue. Calder was entitled to rely on the 
content of the four corners of the Complaints — Complaints that 
expressly confined the Bar's inquiry to pre-1987 conduct. 
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Despite the clearly limited purpose for which the Order was 
admitted, the Bar now argues that the Order could properly be 
relied upon by the Panel on issues such as Calder's credibility, 
Calderfs competence and Calder's sanctions, (Brief at 17). This 
argument, however, highlights the dangerous, prejudicial effect 
of this evidence on Calder. It served to allow the Panel to 
make substantive findings of dishonesty and fraud without ever 
apprising Calder that this was its intent. By subtley transform-
ing the purposes for which the evidence was offered — from 
"state of mind" to "competence" and "credibility"—the Panel 
deprived Calder of any realistic chance of addressing and refut-
ing the merits of the Panel's evidence. This is the essence of 
unfair prejudice. 
In the seemingly inconceivable event that this Court 
affirms the Panel's power to use Calder's post-1986 conduct as a 
substantive basis for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions, 
there are a variety of specific reasons why the Panel's factual 
findings do not justify disbarment: (i) the "undisclosed assets" 
on which the bankruptcy court based its order denying Calder a 
discharge in bankruptcy — an order that is currently on 
appeal -- were comprised of two bank accounts containing no more 
2
 This Court has long held that it is improper to admit evidence 
of bankrupty for the purpose of impeaching credibility. Bullock 
v. Unqricht, 538 P.2d 190, 192 (Utah 1975). The Panel's consid-
eration of this and all of the other evidence relating to 
Calder's bankruptcy conduct to assess Calder's credibility con-
stitutes reversible error. Its admission is anything other than 
harmless error. See e.g. , Finding Nos. K g ) and (o), 2(n), 3 and 
9 and Conclusion Nos. 1(d) and 2(b). 
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than $5.00 and a worthless mineral interest; (ii) by order dated 
November 14, 1989, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Utah in case no. C-89-59W reversed the bankruptcy 
court's order dated November 18, 1988 which denied Calder's 
motion to convert his Chapter 7 proceeding to a Chapter 13 
proceeding; (iii) while the validity of Calder's transfer of 
assets was originally challenged by Calder's Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
trustee, this challenge has been terminated by the federal 
4 
court's reversal of the conversion order. 
II. BECAUSE THE PANEL, LIKE CALDER AND THE 
DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES ITSELF, MISAP-
PREHENDED THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE 1979 VER-
SION OF S 41-12-15 OF THE UTAH MOTOR VEHICLE 
ACT, ALL OF ITS FINDINGS RELATING TO THE 
BAILEY CASE MUST BE VACATED. 
The Bar, apparently recognizing that the 1979 version 
of Utah Code Ann. S 41-12-15 did not enable Bailey to obtain a 
new driver's license simply by obtaining a discharge in bank-
ruptcy, now seeks for the first time on appeal to introduce evi-
dence in the form of affidavits from two employees of the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles. (See App. to Respondent's Brief). 
3 A copy of this order is attached as App. 1. In light of this 
recently entered order, none of the Findings, Conclusions or Rec-
ommendations can properly be based upon the temporary and now 
discredited "fact" that Calder's motion to convert had been 
denied. 
4
 Moreover, there is nothing in the existing factual record 
relating to Calder's level of solvency on the date of the alleged 
transfers — a necessary element to avoid such a transfer. With-
out such evidence, there can be no prima facie determination that 
the alleged transfers were in any way improper. See 11 U.S.C. 
5 548, a copy of which is attached as App. 2. 
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These affidavits were never offered, admitted or considered at 
trial and are not reflective of any testimony adduced at trial, 
Calder accordingly moves the Court to strike this improper "evi-
dence. " 
Next, while Calder readily agrees that his " . . . mini-
mal obligation was to so advise [Bailey] so Bailey could take 
other appropriate steps to renew his driver's license," Brief at 
27, the plain fact remains that neither of the Bar's Complaints 
attempted to sanction Calder for this alleged failure. As such, 
Calder cannot now be sanctioned on the basis of conduct never 
alleged in the Complaint and not directly addressed at trial, 
III. MANY OF THE PANEL'S FACTUAL FINDINGS ARE 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
A. Bailey Case, Reduced to its bare essentials, the 
Findings regarding the Bailey case are that Calder agreed to 
amend Bailey's bankruptcy schedules to discharge an inadvertently 
omitted judgment; that Calder failed to conform with Bailey's 
understanding of the terms and conditions on which that effort 
was to be undertaken; that after failing to effect an amendment, 
Calder withdrew as Bailey's counsel; that during the course of 
Bailey's case against him, Calder filed a false affidavit served 
months before Bailey was ultimately no caused at trial; and, that 
as a result of Calder's failure to effect an amendment to 
Bailey's bankruptcy schedules, Bailey was unable to obtain a new 
driver's license. Calder does not disagree with the general con-
tours of this recitation. However, he cannot agree that the 
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evidence on several key issues clearly and convincingly estab-
lishes his ethical culpability. 
1. Finding No. 1(a). Wholly apart from the 
legal impossibility that Calder1s failure to obtain a discharge 
of the $1,400 judgment debt precluded Bailey from obtaining a 
Utah driver's license, the record does establish Calder's misap-
prehension about the then-existing legal effect of Section 
41-12-15 of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act. The record further 
establishes the effort Calder undertook unsuccessfully to obtain 
a discharge of the judgment debt. However, because many of the 
subsequent Findings are derivative of, and based upon, the 
premise that Bailey's procural of a discharge would of itself 
insured his qualification for a new driver's license, any appel-
late revision of this Finding will, of necessity, affect subse-
quent Findings and Conclusions. 
2. Finding Nos. K b ) , (c), (d), (e), (k) and 
(p). These Findings are premised on the notion that the agree-
ment that Bar Counsel, Jeff Paoletti, reached with Bailey and 
subsequently sought to impart to Calder was so clearly and 
cogently expressed as to make Calder ethically culpable if he did 
not follow it. Mr. Paoletti's obvious lack of accurate recollec-
tion, see Tr. 122-35, and his unfortunate decision not to provide 
Calder with any written memorial of the agreement he had reached 
with Bailey, see Tr. 128-29 and 137-38, precludes these Findings 
from being sustained on appeal. 
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B. Job Case. 
1. Finding No. 2(b). In their response to 
Calder1s challenge to this Finding, the Bar asserts that Job tes-
tified that he gave Calder the case number and case name of the 
Pocklinqton case. (Brief at 53). It cites to pages 199-200 to 
support that assertion. However, an examination of that portion 
of the transcript establishes that Job had no recollection of 
whether he gave that information to Calder in November, 1983 
(when the bankruptcy petition was originally filed) or later in 
May, 1984 (when Calder had undeniably acquired knowledge of the 
Pocklinqton case). This distinction is significant in that the 
testimony nowhere establishes Calder's knowledge that at the time 
Job's Chapter 7 petition was filed, Job had already filed the 
Pocklinqton case. 
Therefore, while the record undeniably establishes that 
Job provided Calder with some information regarding a possible 
claim that he had against Pocklington, it nowhere establishes 
that Calder intentionally omitted the claim. Even when this 
finding is viewed in the light most favorable to its affirmance, 
it can stand for no more than the proposition that Calder was not 
sensitive to the full dimensions of the claim and should not have 
accepted at face value Job's description of the claim. However, 
the evidence does not establish Calder's actual knowledge of the 
nature and extent of the claim and his willful nondisclosure of 
that knowledge, as suggested by this Finding. 
2. Finding No. 2(c). In defending this Finding, 
the 3ar accuses Calder of focusing too narrowly on Job's 
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testimony. (Brief at 55). However, a fair reading of pages 144 
and 150-52 of the trial transcript establishes nothing more than 
Job's self-contradiction regarding whether Calder ever mentioned 
to Job the option of filing a Chapter 13 at the time Calder was 
initially retained. 
3. Finding No. 2(d). To support this Finding, 
the Bar devotes two pages to an incomprehensible discussion of 
distinctions without differences. What the Bar seems to be say-
ing is that although Calder could validly file a Chapter 13 peti-
tion for Job in the absence of Job's present ability to earn a 
regular income, the filing could not be upheld in the face of 
Job's prior Chapter 7 petition. That contention is, however, 
belied by Judge Boulden's testimony at page 690 of the trial 
transcript (to the effect that Chapter 13 plans can be based upon 
prospective income) and Job's own testimony at page 152 of the 
trial transcript (to the effect that he did in fact have the pro-
spective ability to produce such income). In light of this tes-
timony and the Panel's own announcement that it could not sanc-
tion Calder on this issue, Calder is at a loss to understand how 
this Finding can be sustained. 
4. Finding No. 2(e). This Finding recites that 
Calder withdrew from representing Job without Job's consent and 
knowledge and that at the time of his withdrawal, Calder knew 
that it would be difficult for Job to obtain new counsel. The 
Bar's response to Calder's detailed attack on this Finding is 
that it is supported by "uncontroverted evidence." (Brief at 
58). This assertion is, however, clearly refuted by the evidence 
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marshalled at pages 58-61 of Calder's appellant's brief. The 
Bar's citation to page 428-29 of the trial transcript for the 
proposition that Calder knew Job would have difficulty finding 
new counsel is inaccurate. This portion of the transcript estab-
lishes that Job had the ability to make payments under a Chapter 
13 plan based on the prospective income that he told Calder he 
could produce. (Tr. 152). It does not support even an inference 
that Job would have trouble finding new counsel. 
5. Finding No. 2(g). Calder's challenge to this 
Finding on the basis that it overbroadly recites that Job 
received no relief during the ten month period during which Job's 
bankruptcy petitions were in effect is labeled by the Bar as 
"hair splitting." (Brief at 59). However, this Finding is 
indicative of the many factual findings couched in terms of 
unqualified, unconditional "fact", which upon first impression 
induce the reader to believe that a general fact has been estab-
lished when, in fact, it has not. As the Bar correctly acknowl-
edges in its response, the Finding would be more accurate if it 
reflected that Job did not obtain any "ultimate" relief from his 
debts. id. As such, this Finding and any resulting Conclusions 
must be appropriately modified. 
6. Finding No. 2(h). Calder appreciates the 
Bar's assurance that this Finding was not intended to imply that 
Job's loss of home was attributable to Calder's action or inac-
tion. (Brief at 60). After receiving that assurance and being 
chided for taking exception to any implication that he may have 
been so responsible, the Bar then proceeds to state that ". . . a 
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reasonable inference can be drawn that Job's difficulty was due 
to Calder's improper withdrawal, leaving him without adequate 
protection of counsel." Id. It is precisely this type of infer-
ence that is contradicted by Job's own testimony set forth on 
pages 62 and 63 of Calder!s appellant's brief. That testimony 
establishes beyond doubt that Calder could never be considered 
the legal cause of the Job's loss of home, as this Finding 
clearly implies. 
7. Finding No. 2(i). In seeking to answer 
Calderfs query as to why he would have any incentive not to dis-
close the existence of all creditors of which he was aware 
(because that failure would preclude Calder from obtaining any 
relief from the debt owed to the creditor), the Bar speculates 
that one possible incentive would be to forum shop and keep the 
adjudication of the claim away from the bankruptcy court. (Brief 
at 61). This speculation is just that: it is devoid of any 
colorable support in the record and wholly ignores the question 
of why the reality of receiving a discharge of $55,000 of debt 
would be lightly sacrificed for the mere acquisition of a suppos-
edly better forum. The Court should decline the Bar's invitation 
to participate in such speculation and should determine that 
because there is no plausible reason for Calder's intentional 
omission of the debt, the omission must have been the product of 
inadvertence. 
8/ Finding Nos. 2(m) and (n). The Bar states 
that Calder presented no evidence establishing any "factual 
basis" for making the assertions in the affidavit dated July 18, 
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1985. (Brief at 68). However, by definition, Calder's asser-
tions in the affidavit were couched in hypothetical terms and did 
not purport to be founded in fact. Therefore, while Calder 
acknowledges the irresponsibility of including such assertions in 
a court-filed document, these assertions could not, under appli-
cable law, be perjurious as found by Finding No. 2(m). 
Moreover, how these assertions can be "indicative of an 
attitude of bad faith which pervades [Calder's] conduct in con-
nection with the Utah State Bar disciplinary proceeding . . . ," 
is nowhere stated by the Panel. Its gratuitous insertion of this 
language must be vacated and its reliance on section 9.22(f) of 
the ABA's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions — a section 
that was never relied upon by the Panel in issuing its ruling — 
must be rejected. 
9. Finding No. 2(o). As the Bar notes, Calder 
readily admitted making a number of transfers to his wife and 
brother after Judge Frederick orally rendered his judgment in the 
Job malpractice action. (Brief at 67). This is indeed 
uncontroverted fact. While the Finding is devoid of any mention 
that the transfers were made in bad faith, the Bar is quick to 
label them as such in its brief. Id. What the Bar fails to com-
prehend is that absent affirmative evidence regarding Calder's 
level of solvency at the time of the transfers, there is no prin-
cipled basis on which an inference of bad faith can be drawn. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 548. Moreover, the pending adversary proceeding 
identified in this Finding has been terminated as a result of the 
federal district court's recent order reversing Judge Allen's 
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denial of Calder's right to convert his Chapter 7 case to a Chap-
ter 13 case. This Finding accordingly must be vacated. 
10. Finding No. 3. The Bar's response to 
Calder's challenge to this Finding is unpersuasive. Wholly apart 
from the Panel's deviation from the In Re Strong requirement that 
the evidence underlying a court's Finding be made a part of the 
disciplinary record, the Bar has failed to refute the reality 
that there is no independent evidence in the record to establish 
that Calder's intent in filing his Chapter 13 petition was ". . . 
5 to frustrate the claims of Job and Bailey." Moreover, even if 
that were Calder's intent, a debtor's invocation of the bank-
ruptcy process entails, by definition, a delay in, or frustration 
of, the payment of claims. The Bar should not be allowed to 
sanction Calder for occupying the status of a debtor in bank-
ruptcy seeking a fresh start — a fresh start that by its very 
nature will always be at the expense of creditors like Job and 
Bailey. 
11. Finding No. 4. Like so many of the Findings 
in this proceeding, the Panel employs the presumptively majestic 
terms of "knowingly and intentionally" in describing Calder's 
conduct. By doing so, the Bar magically transforms otherwise 
innocuous conduct into ominous-sounding factual predicates for 
the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. The Court should 
reject this approach. 
5 Indeed, the only direct evidence in the record on this issue is 
just the opposite. See Tr. 784, 786-87. 
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12. Finding No, 5. A careful review of pages 
388-403 of the trial transcript establishes no principled basis 
for an inference that Calder was somehow careless in preparing 
his own personal bankruptcy schedules, ". . . thereby giving 
credibility to Job's and Bailey's claims." (Brief at 71). And, 
for the reasons stated at pages 71 and 72 of Calder's appellant's 
brief, i.e. the Bar's failure to enumerate even generally the 
assets or values deemed to constitute an ethically actionable 
discrepancy, this Finding must fail. 
13. Finding No. 6. For the reasons set forth at 
pages 72 and 73 of Calder's appellant's brief and pages 2 and 3 
of this brief, this Finding and the Conclusions based upon it 
must be vacated. 
14. Finding No. 7. This Finding must be vacated 
because of the federal district court's reversal of the November 
18, 1988 order. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in both this and Calder's 
appellant's brief, the Court should vacate or modify the Findings 
and Conclusions and reject the Recommendation. 
DATED this ^? day of December, 1989. 
^\^)M*sU— 
JOHN NT. ANDERSON 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S 
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Christine A. Burdick, Esq. 
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APPENDIX 1 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
IN RE; 
ORDER REVERSING ORDER 
J. RICHARD CALDER, OF BANKRUPTCY COURT 
Debtor. Civil No: C-89-59W 
Bankr. No. 86A-03558 
J. RICHARD CALDER, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ROGER G. SEGAL, TRUSTEE, 
Defendant. 
On November 18, 1988 the bankruptcy court entered its 
order denying the motion of the debtor, J. Richard calder, which 
had been filed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 706(a), and by which the 
debtor attempted to convert his Chapter 7 case to a case under 
Chapter 13. The bankruptcy court determined that it had 
authority under 11 U.S.C. § 105 to deny the debtor's motion in 
order to prevent the abuse of the bankruptcy process. 
Appeal was taken to this court from that order and 
briefs were filed by the debtor and by the trustee. On November 
13, 1989 oral argument was heard on this appeal. The debtor was 
EXHIEIT C 
represented by Cy H. Castle and the trustee was represented by 
Julie A, Bryan. Prior to the hearing, the court had carefully 
read all of the briefs, the pertinent statutes and many of the 
authorities that had been cited by the parties• Following oral 
argument, the court took the matter under advisement and has 
since then further considered the law and the facts relating to 
this matter. Being now fully advised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the November 18, 1988 
decision of the bankruptcy court is reversed. 
The material facts giving rise to this appeal are as 
follows: The debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under 
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on August 19, 1986. Thereafter, 
certain of the creditors in that bankruptcy filed a complaint 
seeking an order denying the debtor's discharge. By a Memorandum 
Decision and Order dated September 27, 1988, the court denied the 
debtor's discharge in the Chapter 7 proceedings pursuant to 
§ 727(a)(4)(A) on the basis that the debtor had knowingly and 
fraudulently made a false oath or account on his Schedules and 
Statement of Affairs filed in the Chapter 7 case. On October 11, 
1988, the debtor filed a motion to convert his Chapter 7 case to 
a Chapter 13 case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 706(a). At a hearing 
on November 18, 1988, the court announced upon the record its 
order denying the debtor's motion to convert from Chapter 7 to 
2 
Chapter 13 and on that same date entered its written order. 
It is the opinion of this court that under the 
circumstances of this case that the debtor had the right pursuant 
to § 706(a) to convert his Chapter 7 case to a case under Chapter 
13 and that the right given to the debtor under § 706(a) could 
not be defeated by the court1s general equitable powers granted 
to it under 11 U.S.C. § 105. 
In entering this order# this court expresses no opinion 
as to whether debtor's plan as proposed under Chapter 13 must be 
confirmed by the bankruptcy court. That plan may only be 
confirmed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) if it is proposed in 
good faith. All that this court by this order holds is that the 
order denying conversion from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 entered on 
November 18, 1988 was improperly entered. 
Dated this //^>~day of November, 1989. 
David K. Winder 
United States District Judge 
3 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing to the following named 
counsel this fii day of November, 1989. 
John T. Anderson, Esq. 
Cy H. Castle, Esq. 
50 West Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Julie A. Bryan, Esq. 
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor 
P. 0- Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Secretary 
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APPENDIX 2 
11 USC §548 
§548. Fraudulent transfers and obligations. 
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest 
of the debtor in property, or any obligation incurred by the 
debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year 
before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor 
voluntarily or involuntarily— 
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation 
with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity 
to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date 
that such transfer was made or such obligation was 
incurred, indebted; or 
(2) (A) received less than a reasonably equivalent 
value in exchange for such transfer or obligation; and 
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such trans-
fer was made or such obligation was incurred, or 
became insolvent as a result of such transfer or 
obligation; 
(ii) was engaged in business or a transaction, 
or was about to engage in business or a transaction, 
for which any property remaining with the debtor 
was an unreasonably small capital; or 
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the 
debtor would incur, debts that would be beyond the 
debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured. 
(b) The trustee of a partnership debtor may avoid 
any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any 
obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or 
incurred on or within one year before the date of the filing 
of the petition, to a general partner in the debtor, if the 
debtor was insolvent on the date such transfer was made or 
such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a 
result of such transfer or obligation. 
(c) Except to the extent that a transfer or obligation 
voidable under this section is voidable under section 544, 
545, or 547 of this title, a transferee or obligee of such a 
transfer or obligation that takes for value and in good faith 
has a lien on or may retain any interest transferred or may 
enforce any obligation incurred, as the case may be, to the 
extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to the 
debtor in exchange for such transfer or obligation. 
(d)(1) For the purposes of this section, a transfer is 
made when such transfer is so perfected that a bona fide 
purchaser from the debtor against whom applicable law 
permits such transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an 
interest in the property transferred that is superior to the 
interest in such property of the transferee, but if such 
transfer is not so perfected before the commencement of the 
case, such transfer is made immediately before the date of 
the filing of the petition. 
(2) In this section— 
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(A) "value" means property, or satisfaction or 
securing of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor, 
but does not include an unperformed promise to 
furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the 
debtor; 
(B) P commodity broker, forward contract mer-
chant, stockbroker, financial inotitution, financial in-
stitution or securities clearing agency that receives a 
margin payment, as defined in section 741(5) or 
761(15) of this title, or settlement payment, as defined 
in section 741(8) of this title, takes for value to the 
extent of such payment; and 
(C) a repo participant that receives a margin 
payment, as defined in section 741(5) or 761(15) of this 
title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 
741(8) of this title, in connection with a repurchase 
agreement, takes for value to the extent of such 
payment. 
